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Crimea’s secession from Ukraine and its annexation to the 
Russian Federation invoked Kosovo precedent, in its 
declaration of independence, as an argument for secession. The 
territorial referendum in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 
only five days after the declaration of independence, was an 
attempt to justify the secession based on the right to self-
determination of the people of Crimea. It is overwhelmingly 
considered illegal and its outcome has not been accepted and 
recognized by states, regional and international organizations. 
The comparative elements of statehood and secession between 
Kosovo and Crimea are reflected through analyzing the 
declarations of independence, international recognition and 
Russia’s role as a third-state factor in external self-
determination. Essential distinctions are highlighted. Kosovo is 
widely acknowledged and accepted a sui generis case. Its 
declaration of independence came as result of a long 
monitored comprehensive process; not to legitimize the right 
for self-determination but as the final option for stability and 
peace in the region. Crimea seceded in violation of 
international law through the use of force. While Kosovo is a 
democratic, multi-ethnic new state and recognized by 107 
states, the secession of Crimea and its annexation to the 
Russian Federation is considered illegal and endangers the 
existing international order.  
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The parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the 
Sevastopol City Council adopted the declaration of independence on 11 
March 2014. This declaration was made explicitly subject to a positive 
referendum on joining Russia,1 to be held only six days later. The results of 
the 16th March referendum were in favor of Crimea’s secession from 
Ukraine, and its reunification with the Russian Federation. The Russian 
presidential decree of recognizing Crimea as an independent state was 
followed by the signature and ratification of the interstate treaty for 
reuniting the Crimean Republic with the Russian Federation, adding a new 
constituent unit into the Federation.2 
                                                 
1 Declaration of Independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol:  
“We, the members of the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the 
Sevastopol City Council, with regard to the charter of the United Nations and a whole 
range of other international documents and taking into consideration the confirmation of 
the status of Kosovo by the United Nations International Court of Justice on July, 22, 2010, 
which says that unilateral declaration of independence by a part of the country doesn’t 
violate any international norms, make this decision jointly: 
 1. If a decision to become part of Russia is made at the referendum of the March 16, 2014, 
Crimea including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol will be 
announced an independent and sovereign state with a republican order. 
 2. Republic of Crimea will be a democratic, laic and multinational state, with an obligation 
to maintain peace, international and intersectarian consent in its territory. 
 3. If the referendum brings the respective results, Republic of Crimea as an independent 
and sovereign state will turn to the Russian Federation with the proposition to accept the 
Republic of Crimea on the basis of a respective interstate treaty into the Russian 
Federation as a new constituent entity of the Russian Federation.’; 
Declaration approved by the Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea at the extraordinary plenary session on March 11, 2014 (signed by the 
Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Vladimir 
Konstantinov) and by the Decision of the Sevastopol City Council at the extraordinary 
plenary session on March 11, 2014 (signed by the Chairman of the Sevastopol city council 
Yury Doynikov).” 
See Walter Ch. and Von Ungern-Sternberg A. and Abushov, K., (2014), “Self-Determination 
and Secession in International Law”, Oxford University Press, p. 297. 
2 “Russia takes Crimea back”, Available from:  
http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/18-03-2014/127129-russia_crimea_unite-0/, 
[Accessed 10 May, 2015]   
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While the Russian Federation has never recognized Kosovo, the latter’s 
declaration of independence has been used by the Russian Federation not 
only as a legal argument for Crimea’s succession but also as a primary 
justification for the recognition of Abkhazia’s declaration of independence, 
after its interference in Georgia in 2008. Former President Medvedev stated 
that it “would be impossible, after [Kosovo], to tell the Abkhazians and 
Ossetians (and dozens of other groups around the world) that what was 
good for the Kosovo Albanians was not good for them. In international 
relations, you cannot have one rule for some and another rule for others.”3 
In terms of international relations, Kosovo is considered a sui-generis 
case. Kosovo declared its independence in 2007, after a long-
internationally-monitored comprehensive process. Its independence came 
after a long process of decision-making. It began with the temporary 
suspension of exercise of Serbia’s authority flowing from its continuous 
sovereignty over the territory of Kosovo and the presence of the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo and NATO, based on UNSC resolution 1244 
(1999). It was the decision of the United Nations Security Council and the 
UN Secretary General to appoint a Special Envoy on the Future Status of 
Kosovo. Its Comprehensive Proposal on the future status of Kosovo, which 
became part of the constitution of Kosovo, provided the creation of a 
multiethnic state. Therefore Kosovo is not declared and recognized as 
independent based only on its right for self-determination but as the final 
and only option for stability and peace in the region. 
The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation is considered in 
violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.4 Russian 
diplomacy, assuming that the international community will not remain 
indifferent, attempted to legitimize this action by invoking precedents of 
the past - the non-recognized Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Russia 
claimed that there cannot be two standards in the imposed rules for the 
self-determination of peoples and in the implementation of this principle of 
the UN Charter. 
Does the Kosovo’s declaration of independence, cited in Crimea’s 
declaration of independence, serve as a legal argument to legitimize 
                                                 
3 Medvedev D., (2008), “Why I had to Recognize Georgia’s Breakaway Regions,” Financial 
Times, Aug. 26, Available from: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9c7ad792-7395-11dd-
8a66-0000779fd18c.html#axzz3SC8QFFMf, [Accessed on 11 May, 2015]  
4 United Nations General Assembly Resolution, (2014), “Territorial integrity of Ukraine”, 
document A/68/L.39, New York. 
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Crimea’s secession from Ukraine and its annexation by the Russian 
Federation?! The two cases look very similar based on the principal of self-
determination. The right to self-determination is one of the main principles, 
but not the purpose of the United Nations Charter. In addition to Article 1 
(2), Article 55 of the UN Charter proves the legal character of the right of 
self-determination by describing this right as a principle, as opposed to 
merely a political programme.5 If the principle of self-determination is 
necessary to the creation of the new state, it is not sufficient for its 
legitimacy. The Friendly Relations Declaration of UN General Assembly, 
although not binding per se, defines the criteria to exercise the right to self-
determination.6 To maintain the balance of the international system and to 
preserve it from anarchy, United Nations Security Council (now on 
referred as UNSC) is the only august body which decides case by case on 
the recognition of new states. Its decision is based not only in the 
satisfaction of Montevideo criteria but also to be firmly consistent in 
exercising its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and 
security. The recognition of new states by the UNSC is the most important 
step on the legitimacy of that process. Its decision is based primarily in the 
consensus of states involved in the conflict.  
The secessions of Crimea and Kosovo are assessed through analyzing 
the processes that led to and followed their declarations of independence, 
the recognition of these entities by states, regional and international 
organizations, and the special role of third-state factors in the external self-
determination of Crimea.  
 
2. Declarations of Independence in Crimea and Kosovo 
 
While there is no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence 
according to state practice and in general international law, the prohibition 
of unilateral declarations of independence is implicit in the principle of 
territorial integrity. The scope of this principle is confined to the sphere of 
relations between states.  
                                                 
5 Simma B., (2002), “The Charter of the United Nations; A commentary”, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2nd Edition, p. 49.  
6 United Nations General Assembly Resolution, (1970), “Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations”, document A/RES/25/2625, New York.   
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The declaration of independence of Crimea, adopted from the 
parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Sevastopol City 
Council - with 78 votes in favor from the overall 100 members of 
parliament - was not a mere declaration of the will of the people for self-
determination but included arguments to justify and legitimize its 
secession through using the precedent of Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence. It stated that “We, the members of the parliament of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Sevastopol City Council, with regard to 
the charter of the United Nations and a whole range of other international 
documents and taking into consideration the confirmation of the status of Kosovo 
by the United Nations International Court of Justice on July, 22, 2010, which says 
that unilateral declaration of independence by a part of the country doesn’t violate 
any international norms, make this decision jointly.”7  
The declaration was made explicitly subject to a positive referendum on 
joining Russia. It was announced 5 days before Election Day, in terms of an 
invasion by Russian forces and under weapons pressure. While the 
territorial referendum is the main legal act that defines the will of people to 
self-determination, to be a legitimate one, it needs to be free and fair under 
international standards; otherwise it cannot constitute a basis in 
international law for the sought territorial change.8 It needs to respect some 
procedural criteria and specific guidelines in order to be considered 
legitimate, including the proper timing for such a process9 and above all it 
requires the consensus of the respective governmental authority that holds 
the political sovereignty. Despite having the status of Autonomous 
Republic, Crimea was an integral constituent part of Ukraine.10 However 
                                                 
7 See Walter Ch., (note 1). 
8 Peters A., (2014), “Sense and Nonsense of Territorial Referendums in Ukraine and Why the 
16 March  
   Referendum in Crimea does not Justify Crimea’s Alteration of Territorial Status under 
International Law,’ European Journal of International Law Analysis. Available from: 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/sense-and-nonsense- of-territorial-referendums-in-ukraine-and-
why-the-16-march-referendum-in-crimea-does-not-justify-crimeas- alteration-of- 
territorial-status-under-international-law/, [Accessed on 11 May, 2015] 
9 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1704 (2005), “Referendums: 
Toward Good practices in Europe”, and Venice Commission, (2009) “Code of Good Practice on 
Referendums, Guidelines on the holding of referendums, (CDL-AD(2007)008Rev).   
10 Despite the fact that Ukrainian Constitution clearly recognizes the authority of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea to organize and hold local referendums (Article 138/2), 
it (Crimea) is an integral constituent part of Ukraine and shall resolve issues relegated to 
its authority within the frame of its reference, determined by the Constitution of Ukraine 
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the referendum in Crimea was held without the consensus of Ukrainian 
authorities and in full violation of the Ukraine constitution, which clearly 
defines the succession of its territories through a popular referendum and 
with the approval of the sovereign authority.11 The Venice Commission 
also concluded that “The Ukrainian constitution prohibits any local 
referendum which would alter the territory of Ukraine and that the 
decision to call a local referendum in Crimea is not covered by the 
authority devolved to the authorities of the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea”.12 
In addition to a democratic decision-making process on territorial 
questions, some of the most important and arguably hard international 
legal standards regarding the referendum process are, peacefulness; 
universal, equal, free and secret suffrage; framework conditions of freedom 
of media and neutrality of the authorities; and an international 
observation.13 Importantly, holding a free and fair referendum is necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition for a territorial realignment to be accepted as 
lawful by international law.14 The referendum in Crimea was a non-
transparent process, held in the absence of international observers. The 
ballot paper had no meaningful alternatives. Voters had two choices: to 
support reunification of Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian 
                                                                                                                            
(Article 134). The constitution of Autonomous Republic of Crimea clearly spells out that 
the conformity of statutory acts of the Supreme Rada of the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea to the Constitution of Ukraine shall be solved by the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine, pursuant to the Constitution of Ukraine.  
The Bulletin of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine (VVR), (1999), “Law of Ukraine, On Approval of 
the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,” No. 5-6, Art. 43, As amended by the 
Law of Ukraine dated 19 March 2009, numbered 1167-VI. Available from: 
http://www.rada.crimea.ua/en/bases-of-activity/konstituciya-ARK [Accessed on 
12/05/2015] 
11 Article 135 of the Ukrainian Constitution provides that ‘regulatory legal acts of the Verkhovna 
Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and decisions of the Council of Ministers of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea shall not contradict the Constitution and laws of Ukraine and 
shall be adopted in accordance with and in pursuance of the Constitution of Ukraine, laws of 
Ukraine, acts of the President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Available from: 
http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/chapter01.html [Accessed on 22/06/2014]. 
12 Venice Commission, (2014), “Opinion on “Whether the decision taken by the Supreme Council 
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to organize a referendum on becoming a 
constituent territory of the Russian Federation or restoring Crimea’s 1992 constitution is 
compatible with constitutional principles””, Opinion no. 762/2014, para.15, Venice. 
13 See Peters A., (note 8).   
14 Ibid. 
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Federation, or to support the restoration of the 1992 Crimean constitution 
and the status of Crimea as a part of Ukraine.15 The Crimean constitution of 
6 May 1992 offers wider competences to the parliament of Crimea, 
including the sovereign right to establish relations with other countries, 
thus Crimean voters had no option but joining Russia.16  
The referendum of independence in Crimea is held in absence of free 
public debate, and with credible reports of intimidation. The result of the 
referendum, 97 % in favor of the secession from Ukraine and reunification 
with Russia, is considerably extreme with the results of opinion polls 
conducted in February 2014, indicating that only 41 % of Ukrainian voters 
supported the region’s incorporation into Russia.17  
The referendum in Crimea is held based on the right to self-
determination of the people of Crimea. But the right to self-determination 
is closely related to some specific human rights, such as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and the right to free and genuine 
elections and it comes to further the general diffusion of democracy.18 In 
the case of Crimea, despite Russian claims, the situation in the ground 
demonstrates no evidence of suppression or abuse by Ukrainian authorities 
in exercising such rights by Crimean citizens. The right of secession 
accepted by the international law needs some specific condition to be 
materialized, such as the occurrence of Human Rights abuses, endangering 
the prospects of survival of retrospective groups.19 In the case of Crimea we 
cannot identify such preconditions that necessitated the right of people for 
self-determination, therefore its secession from Ukraine. 
The case of Kosovo is quite different. Despite additional elements of a 
wider autonomy granted by the Constitution of 1974 of Federal Republic of 
                                                 
15 “Crimea referendum: What does the ballot paper say?”, BBC News Europe (2014), Available 
from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26514797, [Accessed on 12/03/2015] 
16 Balmforth R., (2014), “No room for 'Nyet' in Ukraine's Crimea vote to join Russia,” Online 
Reuters Edition, 11 March. Available from: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/11/us-ukraine-crisis-referendum-
idUSBREA2A1GR20140311, [Accessed on 12/05/2015] 
17 UK government's response to points made by President Putin in his address to the Russian 
Parliament on 17 March 2014. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/in-response-to-president-putins-address-to-the-
russian-parliament, [Last access on 09/05/2015]  
18 Hilpold P. (2009), “The Kosovo Case and International Law: Looking for Applicable 
Theories”, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 1, pg. 47-61. 
19 Ibid.  
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Yugoslavia, Kosovo was not accepted and recognized as a constituting 
element of the Federation with the right to succession. Based on this legal 
point of view, Kosovo was not considered by the Badinter Commission as a 
separate entity entitled to secede from Yugoslavia and not included in its 
opinions, despite the overwhelming results of the referendum in favor of 
the independence from Former Yugoslavia in 1991.20 The opinions of 
Badinter Commission were of utmost importance because they defined the 
criteria, the right of secession as well as the basis for discussion and 
compromise. The escalation of Kosovo conflict, because of the suppression 
caused to the Albanian civilian population by the Yugoslav authorities, 
raised awareness of the public opinion and the international community. In 
1998 OSCE mission in Kosovo gathered undisputed facts on human rights 
and humanitarian law violations on a staggering scale, often committed 
with extreme and appalling violence.21 The delicate and sensitive situation 
in the region and the escalation of the conflict constituted the basis for 
including the case of Kosovo in the agenda of the United Nations Security 
Council, through adopting several resolutions and taking action based on 
Chapter VII of UN Charter considering “the situation in Kosovo as critical 
to peace and security in the region”.22 UN Security Council continued to 
monitor the situation in Kosovo, together with other international 
organizations (OSCE, NATO, etc) until the military intervention of NATO 
to prevent the spread of humanitarian catastrophe into the region. The 
resolution 1244 (1999) constitutes the ultimate UNSC resolution which 
gives an end to the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo caused by the 
holders of political sovereignty, and decides the creation of a United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo to monitor the 
transitional period toward the final political settlement of Kosovo.23 
The presence of international institutions in Kosovo, since the end of the 
conflict in 1999, to administrate the province and free from Serbian political 
sovereignty, contributed to the creation of a new multi-ethnic and 
                                                 
20 Malcolm N., (1998), Kosovo; A short History, New York: New York University Press, pg. 
347. 
21 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, (1999), “Kosovo As Seen, As 
Told; The human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission”, Available from: 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/17772?download=true [Last access on 12/05/2015] 
22 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 
(1998), New York. 
23 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), 10 June 1999, New York. 
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democratic state. The option of unification with another country was never 
considered as possible by the international community. Furthermore, the 
1991 referendum for independence has never been recognized as legitimate 
by the international community and accepted as the basis for the 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence. 
With reference to the advisory opinion of International Court of Justice 
on Kosovo (22 July 2010), which is invoked to justify Crimea’s secession, 
ICJ ruled that the declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 
February 2008 did not violate international law.24 Kosovo, unlike Crimea - 
part of Ukraine and under its political sovereignty – was not under the 
sovereignty of Serbia, but under the international civil and security 
presence for more than a decade. UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) decided that 
the international civil presence, will facilitate a political process designed to 
determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet 
Accords25, and in a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from 
Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a 
political settlement.26  
 
3. International Recognition of New Entities 
 
Recognition of new entities as states is not a necessary element to define 
the criteria of its ability for statehood. The capacity to enter into relations 
with other states is one of the qualifications that a state should posses to be 
a person of international law.27 While the political existence of the state is 
independent of recognition by the other states, its international recognition 
legitimizes the state to be part of the international system, with respective 
rights and obligations. The recognition of states by international law is 
based on conditions and limitations that serve to defend the international 
system from chaos and preserve international peace and stability. 
Conditions and limitations of state’s recognition have varied in time and 
synthesize the best experience to preserve the international system. After 
the Montevideo Convention on the rights and duties of states, the 
                                                 
24 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo,  Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 403. 
25 Rambuillet Accords, United Nations’ document S/1999/648, New York. 
26 United Nations Security Council (1999), Resolution1244 (1999), 10 June, New York. 
27 Montevideo Convention on the right and duties of states, 26 December 1933, 165 League of 
Nations Treaty Series, 19 (1933). 
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European Community 'Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Guidelines on 
the Recognition of the New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union', defined the criteria for the recognition of new states after the end of 
the Cold War.28 The Guidelines describe the candidates for recognition as 
those new states which 'have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, 
have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have 
committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to 
negotiations'. The Guidelines define also the following requirements: - 
respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter 
of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights - guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and 
minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the 
framework of the CSCE - respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which 
can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement - 
acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and 
nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability - 
commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by 
recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and 
regional disputes. The Guidelines conclude with the warning that the EC 
countries 'will not recognize entities which are the result of aggression' and, 
cryptically, that they would take account of the effects of recognition on 
neighboring states.'29 The 1991 declaration dealt with the republics with 
well established territories, which requested to be out of the large 
configurations. The only case in Europe in the classical sense of a new 
entity is Kosovo.  
Crimea and Kosovo were autonomous regions part of the republics 
respectively under the USSR and Former Yugoslavia. While Crimea was 
granted the unique status of Autonomous Republic within Ukraine with 
the 1996 Ukraine Constitution, the long and bloody process of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia influenced a different path to independence and 
statehood for Kosovo. 
The process of accepting Kosovo’s independence went through several 
stages, which are assessed and supported by the international community. 
                                                 
28 European Community, (1992), “Declaration On Yugoslavia And On The Guidelines On 
The Recognition Of New States”, International Legal Materials, 31, pg. 1485. 
29 Rich R., (1993), “Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,” 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 4. pg 36-65. 
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In terms of international relations, Kosovo is considered a sui generis case. 
The political solution of Kosovo came as a result of the humanitarian 
intervention by the international community to prevent the humanitarian 
catastrophe caused by repression and ethnic cleansing committed by 
Federal Yugoslav authorities against the Albanian civilian population of 
Kosovo.  
Secondly, the case of Kosovo was monitored by the international 
community, the Security Council members and the Contact Group, which 
have defined the process and provided the necessary solution to ensure 
peace and stability in the region. This process is led and facilitated by the 
Contact Group, with three basic conditions to be respected: No return to 
Serbian sovereignty; No partition of Kosovo territories; No unification with 
other territories.30 These were the three basic negotiating principles which 
guided efforts of President Ahtisaari, Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, on the future status of Kosovo. Its 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which offered 
the best viable long-lasting solution for Kosovo and the stability of the 
region,31 was threatened by veto from the Russian Federation. The proposal 
got the support of all other members of the Security Council as a fair and 
proper solution. Today, Kosovo has been recognized by 107 states32 and is 
in the process of Stabilization and Association with European Union33. The 
implementation of the First Agreement of principles governing the 
normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, reached in the EU-
                                                 
30 “The settlement of Kosovo’s status should strengthen regional security and stability. Thus, 
it will ensure that Kosovo does not return to the pre-March 1999 situation. Any solution 
that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be unacceptable. There will be no 
changes in the current territory of Kosovo, i.e. no partition of Kosovo and no union of 
Kosovo with any country or part of any country. The territorial integrity and internal 
stability of regional neighbors will be fully respected.”  
United Nations Security Council, (2005), “Guiding principles of the Contact Group for a 
settlement of the status of Kosovo”, document S/2005/709, New York. 
31 United Nations Security Council, (2007) “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement”, document S/2007/168/Add.1, New York. 
32 As of July 2, 2014, Togo is the 107th state to recognize Kosovo as an independent and 
sovereign state. Available from: http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,4,2381, [Accessed 2 
July, 2014] 
33 European Union in Kosovo / European Union Special Representative from Kosovo (2014), 
“Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations successfully completed”. Available from: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/2014050
2_03_en.htm, [Accessed 1 July, 2014]  
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facilitated Dialogue led by the High Representative of European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Catherine Ashton), will lead towards 
stability in the region and creates future premises to promoting regional 
cooperation and peace in the Balkans.34  
The referendum for independence and Crimea’s right to return to the 
Russian Federation was rejected by 13 members of the UN Security Council 
and abstained by China. In the absence of a UN Security Council resolution 
to block the referendum of Crimea (because of the veto of the Russian 
Federation), the UN General Assembly adopted - with 100 votes in favor, 
11 against and 58 abstentions - the resolution "The territorial integrity of 
Ukraine", recognizing the commitment of UN Member States to the 
sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, 
within its internationally recognized boundaries. The resolution 
emphasizes that “the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea and Sevastopol city on 16th March 2014, is not valid and cannot be 
the basis for changing the status of the Republic”. It also demands from the 
countries, international organizations and specialized agencies not to 
recognize any alteration of the status of this republic and of Sevastopol city, 
based on the referendum “and to refrain from any action or dealing that 
might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status.”35 
 
4. Third-State Role in External Self-Determination of Crimea 
 
The Russian Federation never accepted the peaceful dissolution of the 
former Soviet Union. President Putin considered it as ‘a major geopolitical 
disaster of the century’.36 After years of very difficult transition, Russian 
Federation got its momentum to rise as a regional power. All its scenarios 
as regional power required a new reconfiguration of the former Soviet 
Union. This was influenced also by the fact that most of the former 
republics of USSR expressed their tendencies and aspirations to become 
                                                 
34 “It is a milestone that officials hope will enhance stability in the region and clear a path for 
both countries to join the European Union.” See Bilefsky D., (2013), “Serbia and Kosovo 
Reach Agreement on Power-Sharing”, New York Times, 20 April p. A9.  
35 United Nations General Assembly Resolution, (2014), “Territorial integrity of Ukraine”, 
Document A/68/L.39, New York. 
36 Putin V., (2005), Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,. Available 
from 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.s
html [Accessed June 20, 2014] 
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members of NATO and European Union.37 For Russia and its ambition for 
Eurasia it was unacceptable that its traditional spheres of influence, such as 
Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, become part of European 
Union and its European security strategy. Therefore the Ukrainian 
revolution in autumn 2013 was considered as a direct and eminent threat to 
Russia’s regime and its strategic plans as a regional power. To that end, to 
defer the developments in Ukraine and its new Western approach, the 
Russian Federation intervened in Crimea. This would leave Ukraine in bias 
and secure its strategic advantages in the Black Sea. This is the second case 
when the territories of other independent countries have been forcefully 
seized, after the peaceful dissolution of the former Soviet Union. In 2008, 
Russian troops occupied the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from 
Georgia. The Crimean events might indicate that Georgia’s conflict didn’t 
occur by chance but signaled the beginning of a geo-strategic scenario for 
restoring the power of the former Russian Empire.38 As Brzezinski has 
noted, ‘Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire’.39 
An argument used by the Russian Federation for reuniting with Crimea 
is the historical one. Crimea was part of Russia from 1783, when the Tsarist 
Empire annexed it a decade after defeating Ottoman forces in the Battle of 
Kozludzha, until 1954, when the Soviet government transferred Crimea 
from the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics (RSFSR) to the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR).40 56% of population in 
Crimea is Russian, 27 % Ukrainian and the rest is Tartar minority. Crimea 
is historically as close to Russia as to Ukraine. Although history serves to 
                                                 
37 ‘In an April 17 interview, Putin declared, “We have reached a point beyond which we 
cannot retreat.” ....The Kremlin’s determination to stop the advance of Euro-Atlantic 
institutions was signaled in a smaller campaign against Georgia in 2008.’  
   Roberts C. (2014) “The Czar of Brinkmanship,” Foreign Affairs, Available from  
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141390/cynthia-a-roberts/the-czar-of-
brinkmanship, [Accessed 11 March, 2015] 
38 ‘Russia’s invasion of this Ukrainian region is at once a replay and an escalation of tactics 
that the Kremlin has used for the past two decades to maintain its influence across the 
domains of the former Soviet Union.’ 
Mankoff J., (2014), “Russia's Latest Land Grab; How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine,” 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No 3.  
39 Brzeznisky Z., (1997), “The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic 
Imperatives”, New York: Basic Books. pg 56. 
40 Kramer M., (2014), “The Transfer of Crimea from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine, 1954”, 
London: Wilson    Center. Available from: http://wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-
russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago#intro [Accessed 11 March, 2015] 
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throw light on and understand current conditions, it is not the essential 
element to be considered in the developments of international relations and 
world system. The old dictum that international law is not an instrument 
for the revision of history, finds here a particular specification.  
Another strong argument used by the Russian Federation is the 
protection of Russian “compatriots” (sootechestvenniki)41. To fulfill its Euro-
Asian strategy, the Russian Federation has raised the issue of its Russian 
compatriots in the former republics of USSR. Russia claims to protect its 
own citizens through intervening by force or creating parallel structures 
(Republic of Donetsk in Ukraine, Transnistria in Moldova, South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia in Georgia, etc). So Russia pressures not only Ukraine but 
also Baltic countries, Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan through using the 
strategy of ethnic division to the existing frozen conflicts in these countries 
to intervene when it feels its influence is threatened.42  
The use of force by the Russian Federation in Ukraine and other 
countries and the use of Kosovo precedent to justify its interventions in its 
spheres of influence are means to its end. Crimea’s referendum and its 
unification with the Russian Federation is a clear breach of international 
law because it violates the international obligations of Russia, treaties and 
memorandums where Russia is a party member and is committed to 
respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Russia acted in 
violence of Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances (1994), based 
on which Russia together with the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirmed their 
commitment to Ukraine, and confirmed to respect the independence and 
sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.43 Russia breached also the 
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and 
                                                 
41 “compatriots” (sootechestvenniki) - a flexible term enshrined in Russian legislation that 
implies a common fatherland and gives Putin great latitude in determining just whom it 
includes. See Jeffrey Mankoff, Russia's Latest Land Grab: How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine, 
Vol. 93, No.3, Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2014). 
42 Ibid.  
43 United Nations Security Council, (1994), Memorandums on Security Assurances in Connection 
with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Document 
A/49/765, December 5, Available from 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_1994_1399.pdf, [Accessed 11 March, 2015] 
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The paper highlights essential distinctions in assessing Crimea and 
Kosovo. If the declaration of independence of Kosovo is invoked as a 
precedent to justify the secession of new entities, including Crimea, it is 
very significant to note that ICJ decisions are legally binding only on the 
parties to the case and only with respect to the case in question. They are 
not binding on other states or the Court itself and as a result ICJ cases do 
not create precedents.45  
The first distinction consists in the processes of the right to self-
determination of the people of Kosovo and Crimea. Kosovo didn’t declare 
the independence as a result of its expressed will for self-determination 
through the referendum. It was the ethnic cleansing and the need to protect 
fundamental freedoms and human rights that led to the international 
community’s action in Kosovo. The political solution of the Kosovo conflict 
came as the last viable alternative to secure peace and stability in the 
region. In the case of Crimea, the referendum is a unilateral act to impose a 
political solution based on force. 
The second distinction consists in the fact that Kosovo crisis is widely 
discussed in the Security Council, which is never expressed against a final 
political settlement based on the will of people. The SC resolution 1244 
(1999) includes, as its annex, The Rambouillet Accord that takes into 
account the political solution of Kosovo. Regarding Crimea, UNSC member 
states preliminary articulated the non-recognition of the referendum and 
strongly stated in favor of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.46  
                                                 
44 See Chapters IX and X of the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine. 
45 “This is explicitly stated in article 59 of the Statute: “The decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” This is 
logically necessary if states are to remain sovereign and the modern system is to retain 
state sovereignty as its legal foundation, for if decisions of the ICJ were able to create 
precedents then states would find themselves bound by rules that arose from cases in 
which they had no part. This would contradict state sovereignty.” 
See Hurd I., (2011), “International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice”, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1st Edition, p. 194. 
46 United Nations Security Council,  (2014), “UN Security Council action on Crimea referendum 
blocked”, 15 March, Available from 
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The third distinction arises from the political reasons behind the two 
cases. In the case of Kosovo, there was no influence from Albania in 
Kosovo’s succession and the idea of national unification is always ruled 
out. In the case of Crimea, the influence of Russian Federation is of crucial 
importance and the annexation of its territories was part of the political 
solution. The efforts of the Russian Federation to use the Kosovo precedent 
in the case of Crimea are used as a precondition to legitimize the case in the 
UN Security Council. Russian Federation tried to highlight that the action 
of international community and the West is based on double standards. 
Mentioning Kosovo as a precedent to justify the actions of Russian 
Federation in Crimea doesn’t stand as a legal argument and an accurate 
precedent to justify its separation from Ukraine and annexation by Russia, 
but as a direct pressure on Europe and the United States to remind the 
international community that Russia is a world power and has the right to 
act on its spheres of influence. Despite that, the Russian position on Kosovo 
is not consistent. In the Security Council meeting, the day after the 
declaration of Kosovo’s independence, the Russian Ambassador stated that 
"The unilateral declaration of independence and its recognition are not in 
alignment with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, which clearly 
define the principles of territorial sovereignty and integrity of the states”.47 
In fact, this argument exposes the negative influence of the veto power in 
the UNSC, when the veto of a sole country defines the position of the 
international body, entrusted to maintain international peace and security. 
At the same time, it demonstrates the rising tendencies of regional powers 
towards their spheres of influence and a come-back of geopolitics and use 
of force, in an environment where liberal international order is based on 
consensus. The reference and the parallel set between Kosovo and Crimea 
demonstrate Russian current position of a world that must be again subject 




                                                                                                                            
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47362#.U3D9soGSzVF, [Accessed 10 
March, 2015]. 
47 UK government's response to points made by President Putin in his address to the 
Russian Parliament on 17 March 2014. Available from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/in-response-to-president-putins-address-to-the-
russian-parliament [Access 09 May, 015]. 
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